


Security Model in the Ambient Computational Environment



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May 24, 2004

Committee: Dr. Minden, Dr. Agah, Dr.
Alexander

Thanks



- Dr. Minden
- Dr. Agah and Dr. Alexander
- Leon Searl
- Eric Akers, Renzo Hayashi and Olaf Landsiedel
- All of the audience members for attending

Overview



- Related Work
- Ambient Computational Environment
- Enhanced RMI
- Encryption and Authentication
- Keynote Trust-Management
- Future Work

Related Work



- Remote Method Invocation (RMI)
 - Remote Access to a service
 - Stubs
- JINI
 - Discovery
 - Join
 - Lookup
- Ninja
 - Similar model to ACE
 - NinjaRMI
 - Secure Directory Service

Ambient Computational Environment




- Computational Resources are available throughout the environment
- Users can co-opt services in their vicinity
- Computational Sessions are long lived and not tied to any one room
- Computational environment reacts to audio and visual cues from the user

Service Architecture



- Services are the core components
- Services designed to be simple and perform only one function
- More complex services can be formed by federating services
- A number of “core services” exist for users and services to learn about the environment

Room View




Service Communications



- Two main communications channels
- Control Channel
 - Reliable
 - In-order delivery
 - Bi-directional
- Media Channel
 - Unreliable
 - Unidirectional
 - Timeliness

Service Architecture





Service Federations



- Simple Services
 - One function
 - Cannot directly use most other services
- Complex Services can be formed by creating federations
- Federations are managed by a client called a manager
- Federation exists while the manager wants it to
- After a federation ends, the services can join other federations

Service Federations





Core Services



- **Service Directory**
 - Stores where the services are in the network and environment
- **User Database**
 - “passwd” equivalent
- **Room Database**
 - Describes buildings, machines, and rooms
- **Authentication Database**
 - Stores Keynote assertions for authentication

Core Services




User Identification





- Users are identified by their public keys
- Certificate Authority (CA) for Key validation
 - Keys can be revoked using RCL functionality
- Keys are x509 certificates containing the public key and the CA's signature
 - Remote users could have the same login, but key signed by two different CA
- Keys are used for two purposes
 - Identifying the user for TLS protocol
 - Authorizing the user under Keynote
- Private Keys protected by operating system mechanisms
 - Users are logged into the system using ID Monitors
- Global Users known as “ace” who functions as the root

ID Monitor



Service Hierarchy



Enhanced RMI




- Used to implement the Control Channels
- Improvement over standard RMI
 - Uses standard RMI tools like rmiregistry
- Stateful connections
- Per-user/per-method security
- Transport Layer Security (TLS)
 - Transmit protection
 - Authentication
- Keynote for Authorization

Enhanced RMI Objects



- **SecureRemoteUnicastObject**
 - Replaces `java.rmi.server.RemoteUnicastServer`
 - Extended by other classes to implement Enhanced RMI
 - Thread handles new connections
- **ClientServerThreads**
 - One thread per client
 - Holds the reference to the current user and keynote session
- **java.rmi.Remote**
 - Interface that the RemoteObjects extend
- **Stub**
 - Generated from the implementation by StubGenerator
 - Passed to the client to access the remote service
- **Communicates via Messages**
 - Serialized objects containing method signature, arguments and/or returns

Enhanced RMI




Encryption



- Control Channels use TLS
 - Authenticates the remote user
 - Encrypts the data in transit
- Media Channels use a symmetric AES cipher and SHA-1 to test for data errors
- Keyed with a session key that is used to decrypt the packet key

Media Packet




Protected with the Session Key



Not Protected



Protected with the Packet Key



Keynote Trust-Management



- Trust-Management contains
 - Language for describing actions
 - System for identifying principles
 - A language for describing which actions the principles can perform
 - A method for the principles to pass their authorizations to other principles.
 - A compliance checker for the above requirements
- Keynote uses the same language
 - Describing actions
 - Describing which actions a user can perform
 - Passing authorizations to other users
- Used the Keynote Implementation provided by Univ. of Pennsylvania

Keynote Compliance Checker



- Policy Assertions
 - Base of the tree
 - Identified by the policy authorizer
- Credential Assertions
 - Signed assertions
 - Can be added at any time
 - Allow for permissions to be passed from one service to another
- Conditions
 - Variable/Value pairs
 - Checked by Equality, Simple Math, or regex expressions
- Compliance Checker
 - Breadth first search for highest permission level
 - Starts from Policy assertions

Keynote Assertion




```
keynote-version: 2
authorizer: "x509-base64:MIIEZzCCA9CgAw...LCSG0N2ICh"
local-constants: KEY1 = "x509-base64:MIIE...ighRT4523k"
licensees: KEY1
conditions: ((APP_DOMAIN == "ACE") &&
  (time >= 1082390980610) &&
  (time <= 1082390980628)) -> "write";
  ((APP_DOMAIN == "ACE") -> "read";
signature: "sig-rsa-sha1-base64:Nt4+XIP...soP+mgjjTXWA=="
```


Permission Levels and Conditions



- Levels
 - no_access
 - read
 - write
 - administrator
- Default Conditions
 - Time
 - Method Name
 - Service Type
 - Room
 - Other conditions can be added by the services as needed.

Keynote Operations



Future Work



- XML-RPC for the messages
- Secure Network File System
 - Access to keys
 - Secure Long Term Storage
- Visual and Audio Logins
 - How to tell one user from another
 - How to tell when a user has “logged out”